From the consequences generated by the dark fleet to geopolitics and protection of marine resources, the energy sector faces a variety of vulnerabilities in the area.

Piracy statistics by themselves can lead stakeholders in the energy sector to conclude that their assets in Southeast Asia face few threats. Judging solely on such statistics, it would appear that vessels related to the energy sector, whether VLCCs, OSVs or stationary platforms, are rarely impacted by significant threats.

The discussion in the French Assembly about a constitutional law changing rules for local elections in New Caledonia led to violence across the French South Pacific Territory, directly impacting maritime activities on the island.

This last Tuesday, 28 May 2024, the state of emergency in New Caledonia was lifted by the French Government after two weeks of intense tensions.

The UK introduced new physical checks for ‘medium’ and ‘high-risk’ animal and plant products in April 2024, as part of the post-Brexit Border Target Operating Model.

However, glitches and delays in Dover and at the Channel Tunnel have raised concerns about the impact of these procedures on road transport operations as the country continues to be one of the primary European cargo crime hotspots.

In late February 2024, Haiti’s ongoing multidimensional crisis escalated into widespread gang violence, rendering institutions non-functional and causing an acute humanitarian crisis.

Shipping operations in Port-au-Prince have been severely disrupted, with attacks on port infrastructure and ships leading to the repeated suspension of operations at different facilities, limiting aid delivery and further aggravating the situation.

The release of the bulk carrier ABDULLAH for a claimed ransom of $5 million shows the potential rewards for Somali pirates. At the same time, naval activity off Somalia remains robust, and future pirate operations will likely be making their own risk-reward calculations.

The recent hijackings of the bulk carriers RUEN and ABDULLAH and their detention off the Somali coast has been reminiscent of the Indian Ocean piracy threat of old.

India’s commissioning of its new base, INS Jatuyu, is vital for the Indian Ocean region, reinforcing its efforts in anti-piracy in the Western Arabian Sea.

The Indian Navy took a big step towards strengthening its operational capabilities with the recent commissioning of its new base, INS Jatayu, located on Minicoy Island in Lakshadweep off India’s west coast. This move aims to strengthen the Indian Navy’s position within the Lakshadweep archipelago and expand its operational reach, capacity building, and support within the area.

Although international attention and the shipping industry are focused on the situation in the Red Sea, the resurgence of piracy in the Indian Ocean since November 2023 is also a rising concern that should not be overlooked.

While the first attacks were often linked to fishing conflicts in Somali waters, several attacks have also targeted commercial vessels on the high seas, as shown by the case of the RUEN and the ABDULLAH.

Shipping operations in the northern Black Sea has been hampered by local weather conditions during the winter months. This has affected military operations as well, which poses an interesting question: has the winter weather decreased the security threats to shipping?

The full year of 2023 saw a nearly 17% increase in the number of recorded incidents in the Black Sea compared with 2022.

Evidence collected by the Risk Intelligence team on the LandRisk Logistics System shows a 45% rise in activism incidents affecting the supply chain in 2023 compared to the previous year. Reflecting on those incidents highlights the vulnerability of businesses unprepared for potential outbreaks of social and political discontent.

2023 was a year of severe social unrest, marked by large protest movements, riots, wide-reaching strike actions and social disobedience.

Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland for maritime access to the Gulf of Aden is already causing regional ripples and Somalia’s opposition is sparking regional concerns.

Ethiopia recently announced it had signed an agreement with Somaliland for the lease of Berbera port. So far, it appears the terms include a 20-year lease of a several kilometres long stretch of coast around Berbera port, the freedom to engage in economic activity in that zone, and the presence of an Ethiopian military component around the port.

On 6 January 2024, a suspicious drug smuggling vessel was sabotaged resulting in the disappearance of five Senegalese commandos who were inspecting the vessel. This incident highlights once again that the notorious ‘Highway 10’ (South America to West Africa) is a route that is still active in regard to cocaine trafficking. This resurgence of the route will test West Africa`s resilience and can potentially reshape cocaine imports into Europe.

Several West African countries have been deemed as emerging cocaine hotspots by the UNODC. Countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal have been locations where international crime syndicates have expanded and established a transit station of drugs destined for the European market.

The Taiwanese Presidential Election is set to be held on 13 January 2024 with three presidential candidates who have been nominated by the major parties. Given the different perspectives on cross-strait relations, this election will be an important one for the region as it will affect future maritime security in the Taiwan Strait.

The political landscape in Taiwan is primarily characterised by a division between two major parties: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP generally leans towards advocating for Taiwanese autonomy, promoting Taiwanese identity, and maintaining a sceptical stance towards China.

Local weather conditions are likely to influence the events of the coming weeks, and months – though to varying degrees. This for both commercial maritime and military operations. This may, therefore, lead to additional perils to operating in the Black Sea, if intensity both in vessel traffic and military operations occur. However, the only truly predictable factor, is the unpredictability of the actors involved.

With recent global attention shifting towards the situation in Israel and Gaza, this should not be at the expense of less focus on the continuing war in Ukraine, where Russian forces continue to target and attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

The deteriorating regional geopolitical context since the Hamas attack on 7 October has highlighted the vulnerability of port facilities, offshore gas operations and shipping to ballistic threats from missiles, rockets, and drones.

Israel, engaged in a complex conflict in Gaza, must protect itself from the artillery and ballistic threat of Hezbollah on its northern and north-eastern flanks, in the south with Hamas, and in the Red Sea from the Houthi ballistic threat that is targeting the Gulf of Aqaba area. Israel relies mainly on its Iron Dome system, and its naval version at sea, to counter this threat.

Iran is pursuing contradictory priorities: preserving its proxy network and preserving its reputation of reliability, which implies an active hostility to Israel but still short of a wider war that it does not want.

A month after the 7 October attack by Hamas against Israel, speculation about Iran’s role in the current crisis is rife, as the Iranian government has been tight-lipped about its intentions.

Although injuries to crew as a result of vessel boardings in these straits are rare, there was a noticeable increase in the levels of violence perpetrated by armed robbers during September and October.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore experienced a significant decrease in the number of reported vessel boardings in September. But this decrease was both short-lived and coincided with a troubling increase in the level of armed boardings …