South Asia port security: Sri Lanka fuel crisis
Sri Lanka has been grappling with its worst energy crisis in over seven decades, caused by the shortage of foreign exchange. The fuel shortage has resulted in long queues of vehicles lining up outside gas stations, industries that rely on diesel to operate at a suboptimal level, and frequent power cuts.
The Sri Lanka government has started fuel rationing for vehicles and imposing power cuts for up to 13-hours daily. There were daily protests in the country demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his government. Over the last two weeks, protesters demonstrated in various locations in Colombo, setting fire to buses, pelting stones, and blocking major roads leading to Colombo.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia - a new era?
No successful piracy attack has occurred in the last four years off the coast of Somalia, and the UN authorisation to fight piracy in Somali territorial waters has officially ended. Somalia is looking to focus more on IUU fishing and controlling its own waters. But what does this mean for regional anti-piracy efforts?
In the annual meeting of the UN Security Council regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia on the 2nd of December 2021, Somalia called for only a three-month technical rollover of the UN-authorised international naval missions in Somali territorial waters. Despite scepticism from international actors, Somalia argued that the Security Council’s resolution regarding anti-piracy measures had successfully achieved its intended objectives.
Libya: Rival prime ministers and the country's political process
Libya now has two rival Prime Ministers, and neither seems intent on backing down in the coming show of force. What does this mean for Libya’s political process, and what impact does this have on the country’s all-important oil & gas sector?
With a contested vote, Libya’s House of Representatives in Tobruq has recently nominated former Fathi Bashagha Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. Having previously served as GNA Interior Minister and hailing from Misrata, like current PM Abdelhamid Dbeiba, Bashagha enjoys significant support among armed groups and political factions in western Libya, including among the influential Misratan militias.
SEA: The once feared Abu Sayyaf Group no longer reigns the seas
On 18 March 2021 the last four seafarer hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) were freed by the Philippines Armed Forces. Kidnapped from their fishing trawler SSK 00543 in the Sulu Sea about four nautical miles off the coast of Sabah with four of their colleagues on 17 March 2020, they had spent a full year held by ASG militants in encampments throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Three of their shipmates had been freed earlier on 18 January 2021, while one died during a rescue operation on 29 September 2020.
The rescue of the crew kidnapped from the SSK 00543 coincided with a series of misfortunes for the ASG. The rescue took place during an attempt by several ASG leaders and members to flee to Sabah, moving along the Sulu archipelago on motorboats from strongholds on Jolo and Basilan in the east towards Tawi Tawi in the west. ASG operatives who succeeded in fleeing to Sabah did not, however, manage to elude the long arm of the law. Malaysian authorities tracked them down in the jungle of Sabah, where several ASG militants were arrested while others were killed.
Myanmar: One year on from the military coup
Just over a year has passed since the Myanmar armed forces seized control of the government on 1 February 2021 following a general election which Aung San Suu Kyi’s party won by a landslide. The country is still caught up in conflict, and warfare has spread to every region. According to reports, more than 1,500 and 8,000 people were killed and detained in the past year.
The opposition to military rule continued their civil disobedience against the military regime. The military junta circulated leaflets warning that participants would be charged with terrorism, incitement and violating the electronic communications law. Thus, in commemorating the first anniversary of the coup, the protesters held a “silent strike” by staying at home, closing their shops and halting activities for six hours.
Somalia moves forward but wider challenges remain
Progress on elections in Somalia is looking to ensure that the events of 2021 might be firmly in the rear-view mirror. Early in 2021, negotiations over the conduct of the elections broke down with opposing factions mobilising in the streets of Mogadishu. The latter part of the year saw allegations of a coup in support of President Farmajo. These were significant setbacks for the peaceful transition of power in Somalia and raised the prospect of a new civil war.
Despite the progress made to date in 2022, Somalia still faces significant challenges. The federal system itself is under pressure, and local political disputes – such as currently taking place in Hirshabelle – constantly threaten to escalate into armed clashes between factions. At the same time, Somaliland continues to flirt with independence with its overtures to Taiwan and the US, including reports that the government will offer the US a military base in Berbera.
Russia - Ukraine situation and possible implications for shipping and port operations
How will the Russia - Ukraine crisis affect shipping and the already challenged supply chain?
The recent massing of Russian military forces on the border of Ukraine can be seen as overt aggression by Russia. But it also highlights the unresolved political issues in this region stemming from Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s direct involvement in the two separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, also since 2014. The possibility of further conflict has now increased. This report considers the background to the current situation, how the conflict could play out, and the implications for maritime security in the Black Sea and potentially elsewhere.
The Iran nuclear deal and the new president
There were four attacks against Israeli-linked vessels in the Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea area, for which Iran is likely responsible. These attacks were likely linked to attacks on Iranian vessels that took place in the Red Sea and off the coast of coast of Syria in 2019 and 2020. As well, there was the high-profile assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist in November 2020, reportedly carried out by Israel. The outcome of the ongoing negotiations on the revival of the Iran nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – is likely to have a significant impact on the future of this confrontation and the broader security situation in the Middle East.
Iran’s President Raisi, who took office in August 2021, has adopted a tougher negotiating position than his predecessor President Rouhani in talks on the revival of the nuclear deal. The Raisi government’s hardline foreign policy stance looks to be underpinned by the full support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), which is a powerful branch of Iran’s military responsible for special operations that is often regarded as an independent actor in the region that was sometimes out-of-step with the Rouhani government. There have been no attacks since July 2021 against merchant vessels. But this might only be a temporary situation as long as the JCPOA negotiations – an indication of Iran exercising restraint to show good faith during the negotiations and the government’s current ability to work consistently towards a strategic goal.
Maritime dimensions of the conflict in Yemen
In recent years, the civil war in Yemen has been the main driver of insecurity in the southern part of the Red Sea. While it remains primarily a land-based conflict, the potential implications in the maritime environment are significant.
Due to Yemen’s strategic location, any changes of the threat level for merchant ships passing along the country’s coastline must be closely monitored. Moreover, the conflict is not limited to Yemen. Drone and missile attacks by Houthi forces against targets in Saudi Arabia and most recently the UAE are ongoing, once again highlighting the conflict’s regional dimension.
Broadly speaking, the civil war is fought between factions in northern Yemen that make up the Houthi government, and factions in southern Yemen around former president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, supported by a coalition that is largely made up of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Hadi government is recognised by the UN as Yemen’s ‘legitimate’ government.
Maritime security incidents in India: Trends and forecast
Between 2018 to 2021 to date, India recorded 30 incidents at its ports and anchorages with the highest number in 2020, most likely due to the delays at ports caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Analyst Katie Zeng Xiaojun provides this analysis of the numbers, the key areas to watch, and a forecast for the coming months.
The broad trends from 2018 to 2021 were generally consistent, with an average of seven incidents reported annually; the highest was reported in 2020 (10 incidents) and the lowest in 2021 (five incidents). The increase in 2020 is likely attributed to the delays at the ports due to the Covid-19 situation. More vessels stayed longer at anchorages and, thus, encouraged more theft opportunities.
Egyptian energy policy confronted
Turkey and Egypt’s foreign policies are in an uneasy opposition and not only in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both countries follow a forward-leaning policy ostensibly in their historical spheres of influence, which tend to overlap. The countries’ relationship, historically complicated by both nations’ self-perception as leader of their part of the world, continues to be marred by similar ambitions of becoming regional energy hubs.
To do so, it appears Egypt has opted for a multilateralist policy, likely with an awareness of its material limitations in exerting hard power beyond its borders. Recent examples of that approach are the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which has the potential to become a legitimate diplomatic platform, and Egypt’s coalition-building to counter Ethiopia’s plans for the Nile. By contrast, Turkey has prioritised power projection, notably through military deployments in Libya, Syria, and Bab el Mandeb as well as the aggressive assertion of territorial claims in the Mediterranean.
South-east Asia: The hidden threat of corruption to maritime operators
According to recent media reports, personnel of the Indonesian Navy has sought to extort vast sums of money from operators of vessels anchoring in Indonesian waters, without presenting the required authorisation. These media reports draw attention to the impact that corruption can have on maritime operations in south-east Asia.
With a regional average score of 42 out of 100 in the Transparency International 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the south-east Asia region continues its struggle to combat corruption. Ranked third amongst 180 countries surveyed with a score of 85, Singapore is consistently one of the top south-east Asian performers on the CPI, followed by Brunei (60) and Malaysia (51), all scoring above the global average of 43. Conversely, Cambodia (21), Myanmar (28) and the Philippines (34) earn the lowest scores in south-east Asia.
Black Sea: Troublesome waters
The Black Sea region has been regularly highlighted in media in recent years. Issues like organised crime and smugglers fraud and corruption are the factors that influence the local security setup. Hans-Kristian Pedersen provides an update of the current situation of the region.
The history of the Black Sea being a troublesome water to navigate is known since ancient times. However, these days the troublesome aspect includes issues of navigating the politics of region in general. This is particularly the case when considering issues such as the Crimean Peninsula, the ongoing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, The Sea of Azov and tensions regarding the wider Black Sea such as the South Ossetia conflict in Georgia in 2008 and more the recent flareup of the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All acts by the major regional actors, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine all influence the dynamics of the region.
Somalia vs. Kenya maritime boundary dispute
The outcome of the maritime boundary dispute between Somalia and Kenya adjudicated by International Court of Justice (ICJ) was to a great extent in favour of Somalia. Deteriorated political relationship between two countries brings up significant challenges.
In October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its verdict in the case of the maritime boundary dispute between Somalia and Kenya, which has been ongoing for several years. The ICJ decided largely in favour of Somalia although it adjusted Somalia’s claim by a small margin. Kenya had been claiming a larger maritime area, particularly relevant as the disputed area is claimed to be rich in oil and gas. Kenya's government has stated that it will not abide by the ICJ’s decision.
Russia’s military base in Sudan
After 30 years of absence from the Red Sea, Russia has expressed interest in building a Naval base near Port Sudan. MENA Analyst Kais Makhlouf provides an overview of the Russian project, along with future predictions of how it is going to be implemented.
The 25 October coup in Sudan raised many questions as to the future of Russia’s projected “logistical support base” (MTO base) near Port Sudan, announced in November 2020. At the time, the announce was met with a mix of delight and perplexity in Russia, despite the deal having been in the making since 2015. Formally, the base would be Russia’s second foreign MTO base, after the Tartus base in Syria. Russia would be allowed to accommodate all types of weapons and systems, including nuclear powered and armed vessels without any oversight from the Sudanese state.
Pakistan: Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, are causing a growing backlash in Balochistan and Karachi. There have been multiple terror attacks targeting Chinese projects and nationals in these areas, and they are likely to continue in the coming months.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a strategy initiated by the People’s Republic of China that seeks to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to improve regional integration, increase trade, and stimulate economic growth. On land, it focuses on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors. At sea, the BRI will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major seaports along the Belt and Road.
As an example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a series of enhancements to Pakistan’s infrastructure to increase connectivity between China and Pakistan. However, there is a growing backlash against these BRI projects and affecting the security threats in Pakistan.
Transnistria: Will tensions rise as Moldova becomes pro-Europe?
The break-away area of Transnistria is located between Moldova to the west and Ukraine to the east and is recognised only by Abkhazia, Artsakh and South Ossetia. It rarely receives much attention, although with the various actors and areas of interest and tensions which ebb and flow in the region it would make sense to pay more attention to Transnistria. This is particularly the case when considering the wider region, such as the Crimean Peninsula, the ongoing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, The Sea of Azov and general tensions regarding the Black Sea and the more recent flareup of the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territories in the Caucasus.
Officially known as the Pridnestrovian Moldovian Republic, the area sought independence in 1990 following the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the thought of remaining within a future Soviet Union. Though this never materialised, close ties with modern Russia have been maintained and Russian peacekeeping forces have long had a presence in the area. It has de facto independence of sorts as part of Moldova, but various issues remain contentious – such as the Russian forces. Various talks have previously attempted to seek an end to the presence of the forces and the newly elected pro-European president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, has also expressed a desire to see the withdrawal of the Russian troops and military equipment.
Myanmar: Promises of multi-party elections and an end to the state of emergency - in 2023
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, arrested the president, U Win Myint, the head of government, Aung San Suu Kyi, and other senior officials. They declared a one-year state of emergency. The army-appointed vice president Myint Swe took over as acting president and then handed his power to the country's military chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. In August this year, the military ruler had promised new multi-party elections and a lifting of the state of emergency – but not until August 2023.
It has now been half a year since the military coup. More than 900 people were killed and 4,800 detained in protests that followed the coup. In the beginning, many protesters, such as civil servants, doctors and truck drivers, took part in the civil disobedience movement against the military takeover. However, the frequency of protests has since dropped as police informers were always on the streets to apprehend and detain protesters. More young demonstrators are observed to be holding regular flash mobs in Yangon, although the curfew from 10 pm to 4 am is still in place in the city.
Somalia: Walking back from the brink?
Somalia’s looming political crisis that threatened to spiral out of control and into open conflict between factions in April of this year came in response to President Farmajo’s attempt to extend his term by two years after an impasse over a new process for country-wide elections. Militia forces were arming themselves in Mogadishu and engaged in open clashes in the streets, but opposition presidential candidates and the presidents of Jubaland and Puntland provinces condemned President Farmajo’s extension and mobilised the opposition.
Since then, discussions led by Prime Minister Roble have reached a tentative compromise. Upper house elections will take place shortly – delayed from 25 July – which will lead to presidential elections in October: if everything stays on track.
There is still a risk of breakdown of the compromises reached and the process has exposed the fragility of relations between the federal government in Mogadishu and the various provincial governments. As well, against the backdrop of election instability, Somaliland recently and successfully carried out its own local elections, for some buttressing its case for independence
Security or volatility? Grey hulls and gas carriers mark Egypt’s return
Egypt’s navy is undergoing a thorough modernisation process, accompanied by a marked increase in its naval capabilities. In recent years, Egypt has acquired more than a few modern vessels, including French-Italian FREMMs, increased its maritime presence in both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and engaged in large scale exercises with its partners. Egypt has inaugurated its new 3rd July naval base on the Mediterranean, close to the Libyan border, only a few years after opening its Berenice base on the Red Sea. At the same time, it has engaged in technology transfer to develop its native naval industrial capacity.
This is in line with Egypt’s goal to project power on both its maritime flanks. While such an ambition had already been formulated in years past, it comes at a time of heightened awareness among Eastern Mediterranean decisionmakers of the necessity of power projection at sea. Civilian leaders, and no longer only military figures, are expecting to compete for offshore resources in the Mediterranean.