Egyptian energy policy confronted

Cover image for Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative

14 December 2021

Turkey and Egypt’s foreign policies are in an uneasy opposition and not only in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both countries follow a forward-leaning policy ostensibly in their historical spheres of influence, which tend to overlap. The countries’ relationship, historically complicated by both nations’ self-perception as leader of their part of the world, continues to be marred by similar ambitions of becoming regional energy hubs.

By Kais Makhlouf, MENA Analyst

To do so, it appears Egypt has opted for a multilateralist policy, likely with an awareness of its material limitations in exerting hard power beyond its borders. Recent examples of that approach are the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which has the potential to become a legitimate diplomatic platform, and Egypt’s coalition-building to counter Ethiopia’s plans for the Nile. By contrast, Turkey has prioritised power projection, notably through military deployments in Libya, Syria, and Bab el Mandeb as well as the aggressive assertion of territorial claims in the Mediterranean.  This is quite unnerving from an Egyptian perspective. Indeed, Egypt sees that its historical rival for political primacy in the Middle East has deployed military assets to its East, South, West and North, becoming a stakeholder in many areas of interest to Egyptian policymakers.

There is no suggestion that Turkey has enacted an “Egyptian containment” policy, and likewise little suggestion that Egypt sees this as an effort at containing it. Nevertheless, such circumstances are likely to be uncomfortable for Egyptian leadership. This unease was on display in June 2020 when Egyptian President Sisi stated that the Libyan town of Sirte was a red line that Turkish backed militias and Turkish troops should not cross, at the risk of triggering a direct military response. More than establishing a buffer between the fighting, Turkish troops and Egypt, the threat served to leave Libya’s central oil fields in the hands of Haftar, Egypt’s ally in the Libyan conflict.

Turkish influence over Libya’s oil resources would be a complication to Egypt’s own ambitions of becoming an energy hub. At the same time, Turkey and Egypt’s political support for rival factions in Libya means that that conflict is likely to be prolonged as those factions can count on external support – making them less likely to compromise in the short term. With both Egypt and Turkey looking to position themselves as the regional oil & gas energy hub. Other actors such as Israel, Greece, and Cyprus have discovered, or expect to discover, oil and gas reserves in the same Mediterranean Sea. This has exacerbated tensions, as dormant conflicts are reignited, and unresolved disputes such as EEZ borders suddenly carry financial implications.

And yet, the relationship is not just one of competition. Turkey and Egypt have successfully maintained a trade agreement since 2005, and have not cancelled it despite the tension of recent years. This could provide a basis for resetting bilateral relations, especially now that the post-Arab spring alliances are fraying.

LEARN MORE:

Want 24/7 access to unrivalled intelligence? Get a free trial of the Risk Intelligence System:

Sign up to get a two week unlimited free trial for up to five users, providing access to all incidents, assessment reports and features from vessel or desktop. Get in touch now:

Previous
Previous

Maritime security incidents in India: Trends and forecast

Next
Next

South-east Asia: The hidden threat of corruption to maritime operators