In recent years, the civil war in Yemen has been the main driver of insecurity in the southern part of the Red Sea. While it remains primarily a land-based conflict, the potential implications in the maritime environment are significant.

Due to Yemen’s strategic location, any changes of the threat level for merchant ships passing along the country’s coastline must be closely monitored. Moreover, the conflict is not limited to Yemen. Drone and missile attacks by Houthi forces against targets in Saudi Arabia and most recently the UAE are ongoing, once again highlighting the conflict’s regional dimension.

Broadly speaking, the civil war is fought between factions in northern Yemen that make up the Houthi government, and factions in southern Yemen around former president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, supported by a coalition that is largely made up of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Hadi government is recognised by the UN as Yemen’s ‘legitimate’ government.

Turkey and Egypt’s foreign policies are in an uneasy opposition and not only in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both countries follow a forward-leaning policy ostensibly in their historical spheres of influence, which tend to overlap. The countries’ relationship, historically complicated by both nations’ self-perception as leader of their part of the world, continues to be marred by similar ambitions of becoming regional energy hubs.

To do so, it appears Egypt has opted for a multilateralist policy, likely with an awareness of its material limitations in exerting hard power beyond its borders. Recent examples of that approach are the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which has the potential to become a legitimate diplomatic platform, and Egypt’s coalition-building to counter Ethiopia’s plans for the Nile. By contrast, Turkey has prioritised power projection, notably through military deployments in Libya, Syria, and Bab el Mandeb as well as the aggressive assertion of territorial claims in the Mediterranean.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, are causing a growing backlash in Balochistan and Karachi. There have been multiple terror attacks targeting Chinese projects and nationals in these areas, and they are likely to continue in the coming months.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a strategy initiated by the People’s Republic of China that seeks to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to improve regional integration, increase trade, and stimulate economic growth. On land, it focuses on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors. At sea, the BRI will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major seaports along the Belt and Road.

As an example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a series of enhancements to Pakistan’s infrastructure to increase connectivity between China and Pakistan. However, there is a growing backlash against these BRI projects and affecting the security threats in Pakistan.

The break-away area of Transnistria is located between Moldova to the west and Ukraine to the east and is recognised only by Abkhazia, Artsakh and South Ossetia. It rarely receives much attention, although with the various actors and areas of interest and tensions which ebb and flow in the region it would make sense to pay more attention to Transnistria. This is particularly the case when considering the wider region, such as the Crimean Peninsula, the ongoing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, The Sea of Azov and general tensions regarding the Black Sea and the more recent flareup of the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territories in the Caucasus.

Officially known as the Pridnestrovian Moldovian Republic, the area sought independence in 1990 following the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the thought of remaining within a future Soviet Union. Though this never materialised, close ties with modern Russia have been maintained and Russian peacekeeping forces have long had a presence in the area. It has de facto independence of sorts as part of Moldova, but various issues remain contentious – such as the Russian forces. Various talks have previously attempted to seek an end to the presence of the forces and the newly elected pro-European president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, has also expressed a desire to see the withdrawal of the Russian troops and military equipment.

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, arrested the president, U Win Myint, the head of government, Aung San Suu Kyi, and other senior officials. They declared a one-year state of emergency. The army-appointed vice president Myint Swe took over as acting president and then handed his power to the country's military chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. In August this year, the military ruler had promised new multi-party elections and a lifting of the state of emergency – but not until August 2023.

It has now been half a year since the military coup. More than 900 people were killed and 4,800 detained in protests that followed the coup. In the beginning, many protesters, such as civil servants, doctors and truck drivers, took part in the civil disobedience movement against the military takeover. However, the frequency of protests has since dropped as police informers were always on the streets to apprehend and detain protesters. More young demonstrators are observed to be holding regular flash mobs in Yangon, although the curfew from 10 pm to 4 am is still in place in the city.

Somalia’s looming political crisis that threatened to spiral out of control and into open conflict between factions in April of this year came in response to President Farmajo’s attempt to extend his term by two years after an impasse over a new process for country-wide elections. Militia forces were arming themselves in Mogadishu and engaged in open clashes in the streets, but opposition presidential candidates and the presidents of Jubaland and Puntland provinces condemned President Farmajo’s extension and mobilised the opposition.

Since then, discussions led by Prime Minister Roble have reached a tentative compromise. Upper house elections will take place shortly – delayed from 25 July – which will lead to presidential elections in October: if everything stays on track.

There is still a risk of breakdown of the compromises reached and the process has exposed the fragility of relations between the federal government in Mogadishu and the various provincial governments. As well, against the backdrop of election instability, Somaliland recently and successfully carried out its own local elections, for some buttressing its case for independence

Egypt’s navy is undergoing a thorough modernisation process, accompanied by a marked increase in its naval capabilities. In recent years, Egypt has acquired more than a few modern vessels, including French-Italian FREMMs, increased its maritime presence in both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and engaged in large scale exercises with its partners. Egypt has inaugurated its new 3rd July naval base on the Mediterranean, close to the Libyan border, only a few years after opening its Berenice base on the Red Sea. At the same time, it has engaged in technology transfer to develop its native naval industrial capacity.

This is in line with Egypt’s goal to project power on both its maritime flanks. While such an ambition had already been formulated in years past, it comes at a time of heightened awareness among Eastern Mediterranean decisionmakers of the necessity of power projection at sea. Civilian leaders, and no longer only military figures, are expecting to compete for offshore resources in the Mediterranean.