The Taiwan Strait is a key shipping route, with 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passing through it. Recent Chinese military exercises in the strait have caused little disruption to traffic, but a recent US state visit to Taiwan triggered a significant reaction from China that has caused concerns about future impacts of the China - Taiwan conflict. Analyst Katie Zeng Xiaojun has an update.

The Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan, has been governed separately from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. It occupies an awkward place in international relations. Despite being a democracy of over 20 million people and an economy in the top tier globally by exports and imports, it is not widely recognised as a ‘state’ and is not a member of the United Nations. The PRC government in Beijing sees Taiwan as a breakaway province that it hopes to unify one day, which creates tensions in Beijing-Taipei and regional relations.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February, everything from consumer goods, to fuel, to heating, has become increasingly expensive for companies and consumer alike. With the Summer over and staring down the Autumn and Winter in Europe and the West, heating prices will compound the cost-of-living crisis. As most wages will fail to follow the inflation, industrial action disrupting the supply-chains over the Autumn and Winter of 2022/23 is becoming very likely.

On 21 August 2022, Felixstowe, the busiest port in the UK handling almost 50% of UK container traffic, saw work ground to a crawl as 1.900 port workers began an eight-day strike. The union representing the port workers had negotiated salaries with the port over the Summer, but as the parties failed to find common ground, the picket lines started forming on 21 August.

Algeria and Italy are going through a gas-fed honeymoon. Over the past year, Algeria has hosted a slew of state visits by high-ranking Italian officials, including President Sergio Mattarella and Prime Minister Mario Draghi. The Draghi Government’s commitment to the partnership was such that the Italian PM visited Algeria in July, even while embroiled in a domestic political crisis that ultimately led to the breakdown of Italy’s ruling coalition.

On July 18 2022, a host of agreements were announced between both countries, covering everything from counter-extremism efforts to large infrastructure projects. Crucially, Algeria committed to increasing its gas deliveries to Italy, delivering upwards of 9 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2023, up from 3 bcm in 2021.

In addition to the many challenges faced by Egypt, including inflation and the grain crisis due to the conflict in Ukraine, the Egyptian government must deal with terrorism in North Sinai, which remains a marginalised area that extremist jihadists from Daesh Wilaya Sinai (DWS) use as a rear base. While the group was still known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, it achieved recognition in 2013 with its best-known attack against the Panamanian-flagged container ship COSTCO ASIA, while the ship was transiting through the Canal, followed by two more attacks 2014 and 2015 against Egyptian navy vessels near the Egyptian coast.

Despite the fact that no major incidents have occurred in Suez since 2013, and in the Sinai region since 2019, DWS resumed its activity at the beginning of this summer. Raids took place recently in May and June, when DWS claimed responsibility for the death of 11 Egyptians soldiers, after attacking at a water pumping station checkpoint at el-Qantara, along the Suez Canal.

The impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and subsequent war, have been felt across many areas of the shipping and wider logistics industry. Our PortRisk team has been on the ground looking at how goods are diverting and where the alternative grain loading has been taking place.

Constanta has seen huge increases in container traffic and the port is working incredibly hard to ensure there is as little disruption as possible as the goods move to land transport.

Grain loading operations in Izhmail are busy with vessels and the marine traffic in the Danube, canals and associated anchorages is already proving challenging.

While crime syndicates in south-east Asia have shifted much of their illegal fuel trading activities to land, recent incidents indicate renewed activity at sea. Although the criminal syndicates are known to primarily target locally trading small tankers, their activities can expose other vessels to acts of theft and robbery.

From 2007 to 2017 smaller sized regionally trading tankers operating on the waters of south-east Asia faced the threat of hijacking. Unlike hijackings off Somalia and later in the Gulf of Guinea, hijackers in this region were not seeking to hold seafarers for ransom, but rather sought to obtain liquid cargoes that could be resold for profit on the black market.

No successful piracy attack has occurred in the last four years off the coast of Somalia, and the UN authorisation to fight piracy in Somali territorial waters has officially ended. Somalia is looking to focus more on IUU fishing and controlling its own waters. But what does this mean for regional anti-piracy efforts?

In the annual meeting of the UN Security Council regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia on the 2nd of December 2021, Somalia called for only a three-month technical rollover of the UN-authorised international naval missions in Somali territorial waters. Despite scepticism from international actors, Somalia argued that the Security Council’s resolution regarding anti-piracy measures had successfully achieved its intended objectives.

Libya now has two rival Prime Ministers, and neither seems intent on backing down in the coming show of force. What does this mean for Libya’s political process, and what impact does this have on the country’s all-important oil & gas sector?

With a contested vote, Libya’s House of Representatives in Tobruq has recently nominated former Fathi Bashagha Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. Having previously served as GNA Interior Minister and hailing from Misrata, like current PM Abdelhamid Dbeiba, Bashagha enjoys significant support among armed groups and political factions in western Libya, including among the influential Misratan militias.

On 18 March 2021 the last four seafarer hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) were freed by the Philippines Armed Forces. Kidnapped from their fishing trawler SSK 00543 in the Sulu Sea about four nautical miles off the coast of Sabah with four of their colleagues on 17 March 2020, they had spent a full year held by ASG militants in encampments throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Three of their shipmates had been freed earlier on 18 January 2021, while one died during a rescue operation on 29 September 2020.

The rescue of the crew kidnapped from the SSK 00543 coincided with a series of misfortunes for the ASG. The rescue took place during an attempt by several ASG leaders and members to flee to Sabah, moving along the Sulu archipelago on motorboats from strongholds on Jolo and Basilan in the east towards Tawi Tawi in the west. ASG operatives who succeeded in fleeing to Sabah did not, however, manage to elude the long arm of the law. Malaysian authorities tracked them down in the jungle of Sabah, where several ASG militants were arrested while others were killed.

There were four attacks against Israeli-linked vessels in the Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea area, for which Iran is likely responsible. These attacks were likely linked to attacks on Iranian vessels that took place in the Red Sea and off the coast of coast of Syria in 2019 and 2020. As well, there was the high-profile assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist in November 2020, reportedly carried out by Israel. The outcome of the ongoing negotiations on the revival of the Iran nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – is likely to have a significant impact on the future of this confrontation and the broader security situation in the Middle East.

Iran’s President Raisi, who took office in August 2021, has adopted a tougher negotiating position than his predecessor President Rouhani in talks on the revival of the nuclear deal. The Raisi government’s hardline foreign policy stance looks to be underpinned by the full support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), which is a powerful branch of Iran’s military responsible for special operations that is often regarded as an independent actor in the region that was sometimes out-of-step with the Rouhani government. There have been no attacks since July 2021 against merchant vessels. But this might only be a temporary situation as long as the JCPOA negotiations – an indication of Iran exercising restraint to show good faith during the negotiations and the government’s current ability to work consistently towards a strategic goal.

Between 2018 to 2021 to date, India recorded 30 incidents at its ports and anchorages with the highest number in 2020, most likely due to the delays at ports caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Analyst Katie Zeng Xiaojun provides this analysis of the numbers, the key areas to watch, and a forecast for the coming months.

The broad trends from 2018 to 2021 were generally consistent, with an average of seven incidents reported annually; the highest was reported in 2020 (10 incidents) and the lowest in 2021 (five incidents). The increase in 2020 is likely attributed to the delays at the ports due to the Covid-19 situation. More vessels stayed longer at anchorages and, thus, encouraged more theft opportunities.

According to recent media reports, personnel of the Indonesian Navy has sought to extort vast sums of money from operators of vessels anchoring in Indonesian waters, without presenting the required authorisation. These media reports draw attention to the impact that corruption can have on maritime operations in south-east Asia.

With a regional average score of 42 out of 100 in the Transparency International 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the south-east Asia region continues its struggle to combat corruption. Ranked third amongst 180 countries surveyed with a score of 85, Singapore is consistently one of the top south-east Asian performers on the CPI, followed by Brunei (60) and Malaysia (51), all scoring above the global average of 43. Conversely, Cambodia (21), Myanmar (28) and the Philippines (34) earn the lowest scores in south-east Asia.

The Black Sea region has been regularly highlighted in media in recent years. Issues like organised crime and smugglers fraud and corruption are the factors that influence the local security setup. Hans-Kristian Pedersen provides an update of the current situation of the region.

The history of the Black Sea being a troublesome water to navigate is known since ancient times. However, these days the troublesome aspect includes issues of navigating the politics of region in general. This is particularly the case when considering issues such as the Crimean Peninsula, the ongoing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, The Sea of Azov and tensions regarding the wider Black Sea such as the South Ossetia conflict in Georgia in 2008 and more the recent flareup of the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All acts by the major regional actors, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine all influence the dynamics of the region.

The outcome of the maritime boundary dispute between Somalia and Kenya adjudicated by International Court of Justice (ICJ) was to a great extent in favour of Somalia. Deteriorated political relationship between two countries brings up significant challenges.

In October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its verdict in the case of the maritime boundary dispute between Somalia and Kenya, which has been ongoing for several years. The ICJ decided largely in favour of Somalia although it adjusted Somalia’s claim by a small margin. Kenya had been claiming a larger maritime area, particularly relevant as the disputed area is claimed to be rich in oil and gas. Kenya's government has stated that it will not abide by the ICJ’s decision.

After 30 years of absence from the Red Sea, Russia has expressed interest in building a Naval base near Port Sudan. MENA Analyst Kais Makhlouf provides an overview of the Russian project, along with future predictions of how it is going to be implemented.

The 25 October coup in Sudan raised many questions as to the future of Russia’s projected “logistical support base” (MTO base) near Port Sudan, announced in November 2020. At the time, the announce was met with a mix of delight and perplexity in Russia, despite the deal having been in the making since 2015. Formally, the base would be Russia’s second foreign MTO base, after the Tartus base in Syria. Russia would be allowed to accommodate all types of weapons and systems, including nuclear powered and armed vessels without any oversight from the Sudanese state.

Irregular migration into Western Europe often grabs headlines. But the reporting focus is mostly on the numerous attempts at crossing the Mediterranean from North African shores to Italian or Greek islands. And though Mediterranean crossings account for the most attempts, there are other lesser reported routes which present the same security concerns to regular shipping and logistics operations.

One such route is crossing the Black Sea. Though irregular migration is assessed as occurring at a lesser rate than across the Mediterranean, it cannot be discarded. Poverty, unemployment, corruption, conflict, and political instability are all factors that ‘push’ humans to migrate – and the Black Sea region is no different. Additionally, as regulation increases in the Mediterranean, migrant traffic may well increase in the Black Sea.

Notorious for its use of kidnap for ransom operations to finance its militant insurgency operations, the Abu Sayyaf Group's impact on maritime security has been curbed significantly by an enhanced military response by both Malaysian and Philippine forces in recent years. Still, the risk remains that ASG militants could take desperate measures to retain some control.

Over four years ago, on Thursday, 23 March 2017, three speedboats with armed men on board approached the SUPER SHUTTLE TUG 1 as it was en route from Cebu to General Santos with a Ro/Ro in tow. The tug was boarded and its captain and chief engineer were kidnapped. Philippine Armed Forces responding to the attack captured one perpetrator and one speedboat. Within four days both captives had been freed, and no ransom was paid.

The right-wing extremist and terrorist threat is growing, as various groups across Europe are effectively using the Covid-19 pandemic and related conspiracy theories to recruit and radicalise not only more normal people, but also current and former military personnel. More people are being subjected to extremist content online as covid-19 conspiracy theories and anti-lockdown pages on social media are becoming more popular.

A current manhunt for a serving soldier in Belgium, as well overt attempts at recruitment of military personnel by Danish anti-lockdown groups highlight how they continually attempt to bring persons with tactical skillsets to their groups. Kristian Bischoff has this briefing on the threat.

Smuggling activity on the Balkan Route into Europe is more readily and easily undertaken due to a lack of comprehensive law enforcement and issues of corruption. Established smuggling routes and procedures have less of a direct impact than when smuggling occurs within regular lawful logistics operations. But negative implications cannot be ruled out.

The Balkan Route, as it is known, is a term describing a loosely defined smuggling route, or corridor, identifying the geographical focus area of the smuggling activity. The route is often considered to be one of the main smuggling routes for illicit drugs and narcotics, particularly heroin, into Europe. It runs through the Balkan countries and is therefore predominantly a land-based route, though not exclusively as there are connections to maritime corridors as well.

Sudan is once again engaging with the wider world, having been removed from the US's sanctions list in December of 2020. The country is likely to return to the global markets it had been cut off from since the 90’s, with commitments of investment from both Saudi Arabia and US debt relief funds. But recent changes must still prove durable enough before Sudan's ports can open to international shipping again.

A weak infrastructure and chronic instability will be the main obstacles to Sudan’s return to the international scene. Domestic political tensions could yet derail the country’s transition. The government must prioritise its ports to stay on track. So what will it take for Sudan do to attract investors and trade to its stretch of coast?