South-east Asia: Is the Abu Sayyaf Group a spent force?

The locations of kidnap for ransom incidents, failed incidents and warnings from January 2017 to date. While most icons off Sabah represent warnings, most others represent incidents in which trawlers have been targeted. (Source: Risk Intelligence System)

11 March 2021

March saw a return of heightened concerns that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) could again target commercial cargo vessels navigating the waters along the Sulu Archipelago. The ASG has been associated with the kidnappings of 85 seafarers from vessels operating in the area since 2016. However, the spark that set these recent discussions alight sprang from an incident that shared few characteristics with typical ASG-related kidnap for ransom activity.

By Thomas Timlen, south-east Asia analyst

On the morning of 3 March, the bulk carrier AKIJ PEARL was approached by a single-outboard motor speedboat while navigating within a transit corridor south-west of Sibutu. The speedboat came within ten metres of the vessel, and three persons on board attempted to secure the speedboat to the vessel using ropes. As they were doing so, they gestured towards a number of empty jerrycans, and it appeared that they were asking the vessel’s crew to provide them with fuel.

The crew did not heed these requests. After the crew initiated evasive measures the speedboat headed off at full speed towards Sibutu Island.

One interesting aspect of the AKIJ PEARL incident is that the position is almost identical to the position of the kidnap for ransom attack against the heavy-lift vessel DONGBANG GIANT No. 2 in which the master and one crew member were taken hostage by a team of between six and ten armed militants wearing camouflage fatigues that stormed the vessel.

However, other than the position, there are few other similarities between these two incidents. The crew of the AKIJ PEARL did not observe any weapons on board the speedboat, no threats were directed at the crew, the three persons on board the speedboat were not wearing camouflage fatigues, and the number of persons on the speedboat represents only a fraction of the six to ten that stormed the DONGBANG GIANT No. 2.

It is also important to consider the present status of the ASG, as compared with their status when the DONGBANG GIANT No. 2 was attacked in October 2016. During subsequent years the ASG’s fortunes have not improved, but rather they have faced continued and intensified military operations that have restricted their movements that previously encompassed the full scope of the archipelago in 2016 to only the eastern-most waters lapping against Jolo Island and a few nearby small islands today.

Amongst the consequences created by the enhanced military response by both Malaysian forces to the west off Sabah and Philippine forces throughout the area has been the inability of the ASG to conduct any successful kidnap for ransom attacks against merchant vessels since 2017 except for the kidnapping of crew of fishing trawlers. More recently even this activity has been significantly suppressed, with only one such incident during all of 2020 and none to date in 2021.

During this time the size of the ASG has also been in decline, falling from roughly 400 militants in 2017 to fewer than 100 by the beginning of 2021, as many have been killed and captured while dozens continue to surrender.

As the ASG’s numbers have dwindled, the PAF has managed to reclaim significant swathes of land on Jolo Island, forcing the ASG out of their jungle strongholds and leaving them with fewer areas within which they can hide themselves as well as their hostages.

The ASG saw hostages taken from cargo vessels as valuable leverage enabling the group to obtain ransom payments to finance their operations alongside other revenue obtained from drug production, smuggling and extortion, an income stream supplemented by funds received from foreign supporters. It is worthwhile to note that the ransom received to secure the release of the two hostages taken from the DONGBANG GIANT No. 2 in 2016 was the last ransom obtained for crew taken from a cargo vessel. Subsequently, the ASG was only able to secure ransoms for the release of crew taken from trawlers, fetching lower amounts. Facing numerous obstacles, it has been more than a year since the ASG has managed to collect a ransom payment relating to captured seafarers.

Against this backdrop, and in view of the behaviour and number of unarmed persons observed on the speedboat, it is unlikely that the AKIJ PEARL incident was perpetrated by the ASG or one of its affiliates. On the other hand, the presence of many empty jerrycans on board the speedboat supports the more likely assumption that the occupants of the speedboat are involved with either the rampant smuggling that takes place in these waters or the equally common illegal fuel sales, or both.

While vessels operating in south-east Asia are well-advised to remain alert to the threats of theft and armed robbery at sea, at port anchorages and when alongside, in view of the difficulties now faced by the ASG that have had a significant impact on the group’s ability to conduct crimes at sea, it is not likely that vessels other than fishing trawlers and other small craft will fall prey to ASG kidnap for ransom tactics during the next six months, as long as appropriate preventative measures are in place.

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