Are the policy winds changing in the Black Sea?

With 2025 to usher in a new US administration, there has been much anticipation and trepidation for how this will play out and the impact on the war between Ukraine and Russia. Image: Alamy

6 December 2024

After a year of waiting, 2025 will see a new US administration. The outcome of the election has been greeted with a mixture of anticipation and trepidation as policy changes over the war in Ukraine are expected. Both Ukraine and Russia have been positioning themselves to take potential advantage of this new situation.

By Hans-Kristian Pedersen, Mediterranean and Black Sea analyst

At the start of 2024 it was often mused that it would be a year of waiting, due to a multitude of factors. Waiting for the outcome of the many elections around the world that might determine any degree of future support for Ukraine. Waiting to see the capacities of both the Ukrainian and the Russian forces, and their ability to continue their respective military operations – with forces that were not expected to see much replenishment, in personnel and equipment, until 2025. And perhaps most importantly of all, waiting for the outcome of the US presidential election.

Following the outcome of the US election in early November, a mixture of anticipation and trepidation has been steadily settling in: particularly based on the unpredictable expectation of what the policy focus of the incoming administration of president-elect Trump will be. Much has been alluded to and speculated upon in recent weeks, but nothing can yet be said to be of any certainty and therefore everything remains possible.

Recent Russian attacks in Ukraine have refocussed on targeting the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This is not new, but the November attacks indicate a Russian intention to place the maximum pressure on Ukraine – both during the winter months, but also to place maximum pressure on the incoming US administration and to strengthen Russia’s position as best as possible in any future negotiations. Ukraine, likely the result of current realities on the battlefield, has been talking up its views on any future negotiations to end the war including various points of negotiation. However, these too, similar to Russia’s approach, are likely attempts to place its own future within the present and near-term context, prior to the incoming US administration.

There are several indications that both sides would face greater difficulties to continue the war in the same way as they have until now. Now that the waiting is over, the next Trump administration is therefore likely being viewed by both Russia and Ukraine as an opportunity they hope will benefit them the most individually, hence both seeking to position themselves albeit in their own ways.

Although the outcomes of any future negotiations remain conjecture. it is likely that any future brokered ceasefire would include both land and maritime based military operations. Much would hinge on how a ceasefire would work in practice, including if any third-party military or militaries would be part of monitoring missions to make sure the ceasefire arrangements were being upheld – for the Black Sea this could mean both naval and aerial monitoring missions, which might also be used as part of additional mine-clearing capabilities – as this would remain an issue regardless of any ceasefire arrangements.

MARITIME SECURITY REPORTS:

Our Risk Intelligence reports provide valuable insights to assess the risks of specific routes and support decision-making with detailed threat assessments.

The Voyage Risk Assessment focuses on a vessel’s specific route and offers an independent third-party perspective on the necessary security measures. The Monthly Intelligence Report delivers comprehensive analysis of recent incidents and a threat assessment for three key regions, available via subscription.

For maritime shipping operators with vessels in the Black Sea, please see our weekly Northern Black Sea Intelligence Report here: