Hamas’ attack happens as Israel seeks to normalise its relations with Arab governments
Violence resumes between Hamas and Israel following Hamas’ attack, but is not expected to spread throughout the area. Image: Reuters
17 October 2023
Violence resumes between Hamas and Israel following Hamas’ surprise attack, which was likely intended to upset normalisation talks with Arab governments. The intensifying violence is expected to remain concentrated around Gaza.
By Kais Makhlouf, MENA analyst
On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched an assault on Israel, targeting civilian and military targets indiscriminately and resulting in a large number of casualties. The attack caught Israeli forces off guard, with the volume of rockets fired by Hamas overcoming the Israel’s otherwise efficient Iron Dome anti-aerial defence system. Several of these rockets struck Israeli port cities, including Ashkelon and Ashdod. Ashkelon’s vicinity to Gaza, from where Hamas operates and launches its rockets, has forced the port to shut down. Traffic from Ashkelon has been redirected throughout the week to Ashdod, which is operating with contingency measures. Haifa port farther north is operating normally.
Israel has since launched a counteroffensive on Gaza, which has led to a large number of casualties as well. It has mobilised at least 360,000 reservists and at the time of writing is reported to be massing troops near Gaza. It is uncertain whether Israel will engage in a land invasion of Gaza, and what its plans would be if that were to be the case. Israel has also been massing troops along its northern border, near Lebanon, where Hezbollah has engaged in a limited escalation of hostilities. Hezbollah still has the capability to strike maritime targets and has already leveraged the capability in the past.
It is assessed that Hamas’ attack was at least partly designed to upset Israel’s rapprochement efforts with Arab governments, by provoking Israel into a reaction that would elicit anger and condemnation in the Arab world. This has worked to some extent. Saudi Arabia, which had been engaging in such talks with the US, was mulling a recognition of Israel in exchange for nuclear technology but is now seeking to distance itself from Israel.
However, it is Risk Intelligence’s assessment that the new cycle of violence will not end the talks between some Arab governments and Israel. While they will likely delay them, the lack of accountability of Arab rulers means that unpopular policies can be adopted almost regardless of public opinion. In all cases, the recognition of Israel by Arab states has relied on mediation by the US and its willingness to engage in a quid pro quo to secure the public announcement. The recognition of Morocco’s control over the Western Sahara by the US or the relaxation of the US policies against Sudan’s political military elite are part of that dynamic, which remains unchanged by recent violence. As long as interested Arab rulers believe that they can mitigate the risk to their rule that recognising Israel poses, they will likely continue to engage with the US to secure the rewards.
The violence is not expected to spread throughout the Middle East and is not expected to take on a significant maritime dimension. The conflict remains localised around Gaza, and there is little appetite by regional actors, state or non-state, for a new war. Hezbollah’s own provocations have been limited, and no actor has taken moves to credibly threaten one of the most potent military actors in the region. This is even less likely now that that actor is mobilised and on its guard.
RECENT WEBINAR:
The implications of fighting in Israel and Palestinian territories
What are the immediate implications for shipping operations and the longer-term impacts on the Middle East? The webinar from 19 October offered a deeper look at the Middle East and how the renewed violence in Gaza can impact your operations.