Exploring Somali responses to the surge in IUU fishing
22 October 2024
The surge in IUU fishing since 2017 has prompted the Somali government and regional authorities to enact countermeasures. There have been some successes, but the situation is complicated by political fragmentation, pirate activity, and corruption.
By Paul Schindler, Security Analyst Intern
Since Somali piracy declined in 2012, foreign fishing vessels have exploited the lack of governance in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), engaging in illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. According to AIS data from GlobalFishingWatch, this has surged since 2017. Fishing hours in 2023 doubled those of 2022 and reached 15 times the 2017 level. Local reports indicate that foreign vessels have adopted increasingly aggressive tactics, including ramming Somali boats, cutting nets, and even firing warning shots. Iranian-flagged vessels are most common, registering nearly 300 entries into Somalia’s EEZ in 2023. Trawlers, banned by Somalia in 2016, have also returned. These numbers are expected to be even higher due to the presence of untracked ‘dark’ vessels.
In response, the Somali government is addressing the IUU fishing crisis. The Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy updated its vessel licensing guidelines to increase transparency and help identify illegal activities. To improve enforcement of these rules, Somalia has signed a defence agreement with Turkey that includes patrols by the Turkish navy, whilst Puntland has continued to strengthen the Puntland Maritime Police Force. These efforts seem to be successful, as IUU fishing has declined in 2024. However, the decrease may also be due to foreign fishermen being deterred by pirate attacks.
One challenge when combating IUU fishing is Somalia’s fragmented political landscape. The government in Mogadishu seeks to control five federal states and the self-declared independent region of Somaliland. Although a 2018 agreement gave the central government the sole rights to sell fishing licenses, a 2021 report by GI-TOC reveals that Puntland has continued to sell their own licenses. The Garowe government does not publish an official license list, with recent reports suggesting the money flows towards private individuals. Local fishermen, who are competing with the foreign vessels, receive little benefit.
Some Somali fishermen, lacking belief that the government will help them, are beginning to arm themselves to defend their waters. The proximity in both space and time of the hijackings of the AL MIRAJ, AL SAQAR, and FATA AL KHAIR in late 2023 underscore this shift. However, as these attacks started in November, 7 months after IUU fishing peaked in March, it seems that another factor is involved. One explanation could be the perceived redeployment of international naval forces to the Red Sea following escalations in the Middle East. This would also explain the resurgence of profit-driven piracy. Some reports suggest that the AL ASHKAAN was not targeted in a fishing dispute, but for its use as a mothership. The successful hijacking of the RUEN and ABDULLAH also highlight that some pirate groups are following ransom driven patterns.
In sum, the rise in IUU fishing in Somalia’s EEZ has resulted in various responses from governments and private actors. Whilst some hijackings seem to be fishing incidents, others seem to be motivated by profit. Although there have been no reported attacks since May, historical data highlights a decrease in piracy incidents during the summer months, suggesting the possibility of increased activity this fall.
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