Maritime piracy: what recent developments of a well-established threat?
The image features Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet / Source: Flickr
Risk Intelligence analyst Louis Borer recently wrote an article for Diploweb in which he discussed the importance of maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Guinea, and South-east Asia, along with the impact on trade and the shipping industry.
26 February 2023
This article examines maritime piracy from three perspectives, illustrated by two maps: ‘The Indian Ocean Piracy - contained but not mastered, Gulf of Guinea - organized and violent pirate groups, with various activities and South-East Asia - a region plagued by endemic, opportunistic and non-violent piracy.’
Piracy poses a significant risk to sailors, the shipping industry, and the coastal states that border piratogenic zones. It is frequently connected to local mafia groups, illegal trafficking, or even terrorism. Piracy is tied to many challenges and crises that shift depending on the economic and geopolitical circumstances.
Prior to expanding to Asia and the Indian Ocean, piracy emerged in the maritime activity and trade areas of the Mediterranean and Atlantic. The vast majority of pirates operate near major commercial routes, which require specific mandatory passages. Securing the trade routes that convey 90% of global commerce in volume and 80% in value is crucial since most states rely on the import or export of natural resources, energy, or manufactured commodities.
The aim of this paper is to clarify the causes behind the improved situation off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the potential for unpleasant encounters in specific Southeast Asian and Caribbean straits.
Piracy in the Indian Ocean: Contained, but not mastered
Since 2008, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) have been in the spotlight, with 571 attacks and daring collisions, tanker hijackings and crew kidnappings. Geographically, the attacks may be launched from Somalia, a failing state near one of the most important maritime communication routes. The social component was also essential, as coastal people witnessed foreign fishing companies intrude on the resources on which they relied. To protect the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Somalia, fishermen created coastguards to board illegal fishing vessels.
The pirates built an economic model that included action groups, translators and intermediates for negotiations, and logisticians, with the possibility to count on rear bases and storage locations in areas outside the control of any state. They had powerful and deterrent armament, along with different automatic weapons and ladders to approach the vessel. State-based international responses to Somali piracy have included the deployment of onboard protection teams (EPE), the European naval air operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the NATO mission Ocean Shield, and the Joint Task Force 151.
Shipowners have followed suit, replacing EPEs with Security and Defense Services Companies (ESSDs) and adopting preventative measures recommended by the International Maritime Organization (BMP). Since 2012, all of these measures have resulted in a significant decrease in the number of successful attacks. However, an opportunistic strike or ship hijacking is still possible within a 300-nautical-mile radius, particularly in the vicinity of Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. Piracy has become more complicated, with simultaneous illegal actions and heightened scrutiny.
Despite improvements, the Somali Coast Guard still lacks credible offshore capabilities. Somalia's priority are on land, where the country is dealing with hunger and attacks by the powerful Qadist branch al-Shabbab. The sea near the Horn of Africa remains unpredictable, afflicted by threats, geopolitical greed, and potential future attacks.
Gulf of Guinea: organized and violent pirate groups, with various activities
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is being carried out by organised and violent gangs. The majority of attacks occur along coasts and ports, particularly in the Territorial Waters (ET) and Nigerian EEZ. Some of the groups operate at a distance of 40 nautical miles, targeting fishing vessels, oil logistics vessels, or low-tonnage cargo ships in cabotage operations. In Nigeria, approximately 75% of the best organised gangs are centred in Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Delta states. The pirates utilise swift boats with several experienced personnel on board and a variety of handguns and long guns. The attacks occur both during the day and at night, with a higher failure rate during the day.
The goal of these groups is ransom kidnapping or tanker bunkering at sea, which involves technical expertise and a solid network on land to resell the cargo. The attack on the oil tanker Kerala off the coast of Angola in January 2014 signaled the beginning of a trend that will last until 2022. The illegal bunkering of oil between two ships has diminished as the naval capabilities of the states bordering the GoG have improved and shipowners' vigilance has increased. As a result, the situation at sea has improved, with 78 attacks postponed in 2021 and nearly half in 2022.
The Yaoundé process was a significant milestone in the acceptance of the GoG's maritime and naval capabilities growing in strength. Several maritime security initiatives, including the development of regional IFCs and participation in regional naval exercises, have been established. Unfortunately, corruption, inconsistency, a lack of equipment training and maintenance, and political objectives such as IUU fishing and Islamic threats prevent progress. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea adapts to the local economic and geopolitical environment, and riparian states are concerned with retaining regional sovereignty, hence impeding naval cooperation.
South-east Asia: a region plagued by endemic, opportunistic and non-violent piracy
Piracy thrives in Southeast Asia's geophysical framework, with the Singapore Strait accounting for 62% of incidents. The Malacca Strait states are sovereign, unlike Somalia, and the number of islands and islets likely to provide caches, development imbalances between Singapore and the Indonesian Riau Archipelago, and the flow of vessels that anchor in or pass through these straits are all factors supporting piracy. More than a hundred incidents in 2022 were reported, with almost half of them being failed attempts, making the frequency of attacks in the region significant and relatively consistent.
Indonesian pirates from Bajak Laut operate aboard small, traditional transport and fishing boats. Their methods are opportunistic, nocturnal, and violently infrequent. They target slow, dark, low-freeboard vessels in the Singapore Strait; stealing engine replacement parts, equipment, and cables from anchoring ships. South-East Sulawesi is home to a thriving black market for pirated cargo, which includes the hijacking of regionally-routed tankers. Energy price increases related with the start of the war in Ukraine are expected to increase the tendency for this type of activity, exposing tankers. Another factor on land that could have an impact at sea is the economic crisis.
Piracy in the Caribbean is frequently underreported, making credible and cross-checked data difficult to obtain. The figures may differ based on the criteria employed, and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) may define piracy differently than the UNCLOS definition. A multidisciplinary and multiscalar approach is required to address the numerous ramifications of piracy. Piracy can also be used to justify specific naval presences at sea, such as independent Marines who provide a military presence near SLOCs and strategic thresholds. The spectre of the pirate threat in a critical area could be "geopolitically useful".
Read full article in French here.
- Note: English version above is machine translated -
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