Ukraine and Black Sea update – highs and lows
2 October 2023
Since Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in mid-July, exports from Ukrainian Black Sea ports have been limited. The UN-backed initiative, reached between Ukraine, Russia and Turkey, facilitated the export of 32.9M metric tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs, from the Ukrainian ports of Odessa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny since August 2022.
By Hans-Kristian Pedersen, Mediterranean and Black Sea analyst
Recent activity is worth noting on several fronts, not only on the battlefield and the political sphere, but maritime-wise reports of vessels transiting to and from Ukrainian Black Sea ports is also noteworthy, not least given the previous mid-July announcements; first by Russia and then by Ukraine that vessels bound for each of their Black Sea ports, would be considered as possibly carrying military cargo and therefore as parties to each – leaving vessels as potentially legitimate military targets. Continued targeting, by the Russian military, of Ukrainian ports, Black Sea and Danube, and countrywide infrastructure, appears to be a deliberate intent to further disrupt any future incarnations of the BSGI – by limiting the operational capacity of the ports and the interest of shipping companies to facilitate the exports – whilst risking collateral damage.
It seems reasonable to assume that two significant factors have influenced the increased focus of Russia targeting Ukrainian ports. First, the Russian withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This would inevitably lead to Ukraine stepping up their own efforts to export their agricultural products by any means possible, adding to the Value” of disrupting this trade. Second, the ongoing momentum of the Ukrainian military’s offensive operations, both on land but also operations in the Black Sea. Successes here, have undoubtedly emboldened Ukraine to pursue their own incarnation of a ‘Humanitarian corridor’, in the Black Sea for the exports of agricultural products.
The regional impact on commercial maritime trade remains varied depending on operational location. With the south and south-eastern trade assessed as less impacted, compared with the usual north-western and Sea of Azov trade. Reports highlight the ongoing threats from drifting sea-mines – although the actual extent is difficult to determine, there are enough reports to underline that the threat is present – together with recent incidents which also indicate that Russia continues to be capable of targeting the Odessa coast, including the port and port facilities. It has been reported that seven vessels have used the announced Ukrainian ‘humanitarian corridor’, with the majority being outbound vessels, which had been stuck in the ports from before the war.
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For maritime shipping operators with vessels in the Black Sea, please see our weekly Northern Black Sea Intelligence Report here: