Northern Sea Route: The rising Chinese influence and Russia's concessions
Russian Icebreaker on the water in Arctic Ocean toward to north pole. Credit: iStock Images
3 August 2023
As Russia attempts to find ways to alleviate the impact of Western sanctions, and finding alternative trading partners and trade routes, China has seized the opportunity and is increasingly asserting itself on the Northern Sea Route. While highlighting the inequalities of the Russian-Chinese relationship, this will also have an impact on the wider geopolitical balance of power.
By Kristian Bischoff, Intelligence analyst - Europe and Russia
As global warming makes the Arctic's Northern Sea Route (NSR) more accessible, a complex geopolitical scenario is unfolding, with China taking the lead. Despite Russia's historical dominance over the NSR, it is now being challenged by China's robust shipbuilding industry and its aggressive Arctic strategies. All this highlights that, even if Putin attempts to make Russia’s relationship to China seem like one between equals and great friends, Russia might end up the junior partner in the Arctic.
China has since 2018 reiterated the importance of the Arctic to Chinese strategic outlook, calling itself a “Near-Arctic State”, and being an observer on the Arctic Council. China's growing influence in the NSR begins with its commitment to building icebreakers at a rapid pace. This progress comes at a time when Russia's own icebreaker projects are hampered by budget shortfalls, sanctions, and domestic corruption issues, and even former reliance on Ukrainian suppliers, leading to delayed or cancelled plans. As the need for icebreaking capacity increases due to unpredictably changing climate conditions in the NSR, Russia's inability to fulfill these requirements has allowed China to take charge.
In a further display of this growing influence, and in line with common Chinese policy of expanding into existing maritime infrastructure, China has started constructing its own docks in five of the most significant ports along Russia's Arctic shoreline — Murmansk, Sabetta, Arkhangelsk, Tiksi, and Uzden. This development, coupled with the construction of Chinese rail lines into the region, cements China's physical presence in the NSR and its increasing control over crucial infrastructure.
On data and communication infrastructure, China is also getting more involved. As sanctions have cut off access to some of the major data providers, Russia is currently experiencing major problems regarding navigation, as well as when it comes to meteorological and ice forecasts along the NSR. These problems are made worse by the limits of domestic Russian solutions, most notably the lack of radar satellite systems. While solutions are in development, sanctions on advanced technology to Russia is likely to impede Russian efforts further.
Because of these issues, Russian dependency on Chinese systems and data has increased considerably. China’s plans to launch a designated Arctic monitoring satellite further asserts its attempt to gain a leadership role in the NSR.
While Russia continues to foster a sense, and image, of collaboration, such as suggesting a joint working body with China for the development of the NSR, it finds itself on the backfoot in terms of influence and control. Overall, Russia seems to have little choice but to make concessions to China in order to retain some level of control over the NSR. This may involve barter arrangements wherein China assists in maintaining control over the NSR’s eastern half in exchange for long-term access to and control of raw materials in Russia’s north. Such concessions highlight the considerable leverage China holds over a sea route Russia was once staunchly territorial over.
Implications for the West
It is unlikely that maritime traffic transiting the NSR will face significant security threats, and while the Arctic has traditionally been seen as a “low-tension” area, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the growing Chinese influence in the NSR carries wider implications.
The shifting dynamics in the NSR could potentially undermine the effectiveness of Western sanctions against Russia as the Ukraine war continues. As China gains greater control and influence in the Arctic, it could provide Russia with alternative trade routes and partners – something it needs to monetise the significant energy and mining industry of northern Russia. This could challenge the leverage held by the West and dilute the pressure exerted through the sanction regime and overall reduce the impact of economic isolation Imposed by the West.
In addition, an increased Chinese presence in the Arctic could heighten security concerns for Western countries. The Arctic region has significant strategic importance due to its rich natural resources and strategic maritime routes. Greater Chinese control in the area could allow it to project military power more effectively, posing potential threats to NATO countries, including the United States and Canada.
The leverage gained by China is also likely to increase the demand for more influence in the Arctic Council – an organisation where, aside from Russia, the remaining seven members are NATO allies. The Arctic Council was effectively shut down during most of 2022 and early 2023, as Russia held the chairmanship. But work and cooperation have begun again, at least to some degree, after Norway took over the chair in May 2023. While China gaining status as an official Arctic State is unlikely, the new dynamic between Russia and China may influence international cooperation or policy on the High North.
Lastly, this situation could have environmental implications as well. China's growing control over the NSR could impact the way the fragile Arctic environment is managed. Western countries, especially those with strong commitments to environmental protection and climate action, might find it challenging to ensure sustainable practices in the region if they lack influence over its primary stakeholders.
No matter the outcome of the current tensions between Russia and the West, China seems confident that with more access to the NSR to drive its Arctic presence, it will be able to carve out a piece of the High North for itself.
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