The Saudi-Iranian Agreement or the commodification of commitment
Houthi strikes have reached as far north as Yanbu. Source: Saudi Port Authority.
20 April 2023
The recent Saudi-Iranian agreement to mend diplomatic relations will likely improve maritime security at a high level by reducing a source of regional tension. However, the transactional nature of the agreement – where everything in the future is negotiable – leaves much room for regional proxy forces to continue to act. As well, the other potential flashpoint, between Iran and Israel, remains unresolved.
By Kais Makhlouf, MENA analyst
The Saudi-Iranian deal announced by China carries significant implications, although at this stage these remain mostly symbolic, and might mean more for Chinese-US relations than for the two middle-eastern rivals. In Risk Intelligence’s assessment, the deal is likely to decrease regional maritime threat levels in the medium term – provided it is implemented in good faith, which is not guaranteed in the Middle East.
Concretely, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to resume formal relations 7 years after breaking them over a number of tensions, and as Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Salman sought to assert his more muscular foreign policy, which saw him wade into the war in Yemen. Both are to reopen their embassies, may re-engage in formal and direct talks and, crucially, have broadly agreed to de-escalate tensions in the region. This last point would have the broadest and most immediate repercussions on the geopolitical environment in the Middle East, as the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has permeated most every regional issue, from Iraqi instability to the Yemeni war and Lebanon’s decay. However, there is no specific mechanism for the announced de-escalation, and significant doubt as to how committed each side is to the deal. The agreement might therefore be best seen as broad intentions rather than specific steps.
Nonetheless, a de-escalation of tensions, notably in Yemen, may help neutralise one of the main maritime hotspots – in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, the war in Yemen is the main driver of maritime threats, owing to the Iranian-backed Houthis’ ability to strike vessels from north-western Saudi Arabia to the shores of the Persian Gulf. With the Saudis and the Houthis engaged in talks, Iran can choose to nudge the Houthis towards a “maritime peace” of sorts with the Saudi Led Coalition members. Likewise, a decrease in tensions with the SLC members, including the UAE, can lead to a marginally safer Persian Gulf transit as Iran’s naval forces could refrain from its current harassment of transiting vessels.
Exploring the shifting geopolitics of the Middle East
Despite the likely improvement in maritime security, there is no indication that Iran or Israel will refrain from future targeted operations against respective maritime interests, whether these be commercial vessels or coastal facilities. Indeed, with one regional rivalry resolved, Iran might feel empowered to focus on its rivalry with Israel – with Iran’s nuclear programme a potential flashpoint. As well, many Iranian-backed actors, from the Houthis to Syria’s Bashar Al Assad, may still choose to engage in violence if it serves their goals, which are not always aligned to Iran’s. There is likewise no indication that Israel or the US will contribute to the de-escalation.
This briefing argues that the agreement does not alter the dynamics that are leading to tensions in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran are still engaged in a tussle for domination. The root cause, namely the pursuit of regional hegemony, has not been addressed, and there is no public indication that a middle-eastern Yalta agreement has demarcated formal spheres of influences.
Both are still surrounded by extremely agile players, such as the UAE and Israel, who have not hesitated to use violence to assert their own interests and who have eagerly filled influence vacuums, be it in Sudan, Ethiopia, or Lebanon.
Politically, the move is the latest signal that the region is shifting towards an “opportunity-based” order. The foreign policy agility of small states and unaccountable governments, who share the perception of an American retreat and a highly transactional conception of international relations, is creating a diplomatic laboratory where alliances and enmities imply no deeper commitment. Indeed, one can look to the Turkish-Emirati rapprochement, the Abraham accords, or the Tiran and Sanafir cession to see the same characteristics as in the latest Saudi-Iran deal: all are essentially formalised give-and-takes.
The Saudi government’s recent expression of its willingness to recognise Israel in exchange for US security guarantees and assistance on a nuclear programme is further indication of a modern inclination to cross the red lines of yesteryear. In this constellation, both Iran and Saudi Arabia will be expecting deepening trade links from China in return for giving it a diplomatic “win”. This will likely materialise as a boost to their commodity trades, free from hectoring about their domestic political situations.
The Saudi-Iranian deal and its impact
How exactly China will capitalise on the agreement remains to be seen, as there is little indication that it has the intention of supplanting the US as security provider for the region. We might be seeing the development of regional norms which place transactional flexibility and freedom of action above bloc politics or long-term predictability. This commodification of commitment, a consequence of regional efforts to replace the American umbrella, is likely to lead to even less predictability, as everything becomes negotiable. In the long term, this may lead to a situation where political capitals such as Baghdad or Sana’a are mostly sheltered from outright war, but where violence in their territory or on their assets, through direct or proxy action are a tolerated foreign policy tool, and no longer cross the threshold of war.
Such a trend, coupled with the disintegration of territorial sovereignty such as in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, can have consequences on the safety of commercial shipping. In such an environment, harassing, striking or seizing vessels risk becoming even more of an acceptable norm than it currently is.
One can imagine a multiplication of targeted campaigns, such as the Israeli-Iranian tit-for-tat strikes, sudden strikes on civilian/proxy assets, or the use of naval proxies to harass enemy shipping. Proxy naval capabilities, such as Somalian coastguards, Hezbollah, or Yemeni armed groups may be leveraged more intensively to apply pressure during disputes that are not necessarily security oriented. This is already the case in the Persian Gulf, where Iran has seized Greek and Korean vessels for commercial disputes.
This agreement does not mark the “end of history” for the Middle East. Regional and global tensions are still very likely to play out on land and at sea. In practice both countries may have agreed to stop adding fuel to the many fires, but these are likely to continue burning and will still expose vessels to threats when in the region. The abovementioned disintegration of central authorities means a host of groups can still consider resorting to violence against commercial vessels, such as in Yemen or off Lebanon, and the low tech/high impact threats endemic to the region will still be in play. In such a future, port calls and threat assessments will still be advisable, perhaps even more so, as threats evolve organically, without the influence of the two theocracies.
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