Russia and Haftar’s Libya National Army grow closer
Deputy Minister Yevkurov (left) meeting Khalifa Haftar in Libya (Source: Libya Observer)
1 July 2024
Over the past few months, Russia and Eastern Libya have been engaged in a rapprochement. What form this may ultimately take, and its regional implications, is still uncertain.
By Kais Makhlouf, Analyst
Over the past few months, Russia and eastern Libya have been engaged in a rapprochement. The nature of the rapprochement and what form it may ultimately take is still uncertain, although evidence points to Russian efforts at military entrenchment in northeastern Libya and North Africa.
Led by former Gaddafi officer Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan National Army (LNA) is the dominant military power in eastern Libya as well as a critical political actor and has recently hosted a number of visits by Russian military officials. The Russian Deputy Minister of Defence, Yunus-bek Yevkurov has visited LNA territory at least five times since August 2023, with the latest visit occurring in June 2024. During the visit, Yevkurov promised that Russia would work to enhance LNA military capabilities and cooperate in the economic sphere. This was followed by a visit of two Russian warships that called Tobruq port during the last leg of a Middle Eastern charm offensive. In the wake of the visit, the LNA announced that 250 Libyan cadets would train in Russia, with at least 100 of them to join naval academies.
Russia’s relationship to the LNA is not only limited to naval matters, though speculation is rife, as usual with Russian foreign policy. Russia has not dismantled the Wagner presence in Libya, but simply rebranded Wagner’s African contingent as “Afrikanskiy Korpus” and left the men and materiel deployed in central Libya. Ostensibly this serves as a deterrent against military operations by the LNA’s western rival, the Government of National Unity (GNU) backed by Turkey among others. Russia has also sought to re-arm the LNA according to some sources, with accusations of weapons being delivered to Tobruq for the past few months, as well as rumours that Russia is establishing a military presence in northeastern Cyrenaica.
There are other concerns regarding Russia’s behaviour in eastern Libya, with some accusing Russia of supporting Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan with weapon deliveries into Sudan via the Libyan border. Russia does maintain economic links with RSF (and SAF) entities in Sudan, and some Sudanese elites are themselves bound by economic ties to eastern Libyan tribes and politicians, with Sudanese militias sometimes engaging in intra-Sudanese firefights on Libyan soil. Haftar’s son Al Siddiq was famously appointed chairman of a Sudanese football club in April 2023 before being dismissed on 25 June 2024, reportedly due to his proximity with the RSF.
The turbulence around Russia’s North African partners has attracted international attention. As recently as 22 June, a cargo of weapons bound for the LNA was seized in Italy’s Gioia Tauro port on the request of the US. In May 2024, the US asked Tunisian President Kais Saied to explain a highly unusual rotation of Russian military flights into and out of southern Tunisia.
These separate incidents certainly point to heightened Russian activity throughout northeast Africa. More interestingly, they also point to an increasingly intertwined mesh of local and Russian semi-state backed economic interests and factions that will influence the political and security situation throughout the region.
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