24 January 2024

Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland for maritime access to the Gulf of Aden is already causing regional ripples and Somalia’s opposition is sparking regional concerns.

By Kais Makhlouf, MENA analyst

Ethiopia recently announced it had signed an agreement with Somaliland for the lease of Berbera port. So far, it appears the terms include a 20-year lease of a several kilometres long stretch of coast around Berbera port, the freedom to engage in economic activity in that zone, and the presence of an Ethiopian military component around the port. Berbera port itself is run by DP World, which has significantly overhauled the facilities, in likely anticipation of such an agreement. In exchange for the right to use Berbera port (at lower fees than nearby Djibouti port), Ethiopia has promised to “consider” Somaliland's claim to independence from Somalia.

The long-anticipated deal has already made ripples in the region, and put many actors on the spot, with difficult equations now to be solved. The US, which already maintains a military presence in nearby Djibouti, will have to navigate between its expressed desire for a military base in Berbera and its formal support for Somalia's unity. Meanwhile, the deal further cements UAE influence in the Horn of Africa, with it having a military and economic presence throughout the northern Somali coasts. The entrenchment of the UAE likely means that the area will be dragged further into the orbit of UAE military and political adventures, suggesting a shifting security picture in the short to medium term, including in the maritime sphere. Finally, Egypt has condemned the deal, seeing it as a threat to its own regional interests. In this case, Cairo is worried by the likely-to-be-renewed presence of Ethiopian naval assets south of the Suez Canal.

The deal is expected to consolidate Somaliland's de facto independence with the promise of economic activity on its coasts, though it remains to be seen whether Somaliland can muster the institutional and financial muscle to exploit the opportunity. However, Mogadishu, which formally still controls Somaliland as part of Somalia’s federal system, cannot let the deal happen too easily as it has implications for other independence-minded federal states in the union (Puntland and Jubaland, notably). These competing interests and priorities may lead to armed clashes or attempts to destabilise opponents through violent means. Somaliland has for the last year been fighting clan elements in the south of their territory – who don’t want to be part of an independent Somaliland.

Mogadishu has limited options in this affair, and there is little it can practically do to hinder such a deal, given the enormous commercial momentum and players behind it. Nonetheless, Somalia does enjoy international political support to a degree, particularly given the investment the international community has made in the fight against al-Shabab and supporting African Union efforts. Ethiopia itself has spent blood and treasure to support Mogadishu and is unlikely to take any action that would destabilise Somalia all too much. If Ethiopia can enjoy the benefits of Berbera port without having to overtly support Somaliland independence, it will likely do so. Commercial expansion will boost Somaliland’s economic independence, but whether it will support its political independence remains to be seen.

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