2 March 2015
News | 25 Feb 2015

PFSO kursus

Fredericia Havn 4.-5. maj 2015

Kurset gennemføres med teoretiske og praktiske lektioner, og har til formål, at give den enkelte deltager kendskab til ansvar og pligter i rollen som sikringsansvarlig for en facilitet.

Undervisningen genneføres inden for rammerne af International Ship and Port Facility Securuty koden (ISPS), EU direktiver og forordninger samt danske bekendtgørelser og love.

For tilmelding til kurset venligst kontakt Jens Madsen, MAHILUM eller Stefan Nonboe, Risk Intelligence
MAHILUM og Risk Intelligence  

Briefing | 19 Feb 2015

The use of Nigerian Navy and Police with or without security advisors in private maritime security roles

(Photo: Dirk Steffen)

Risk Intelligence has updated its briefing paper on the use of government security forces in Nigeria by private companies. This update is in light of the detentions of three vessels by NIMASA in January 2015 on the grounds of the unauthorised use of armed and unarmed security advisers. Subsequent communications in the press have led to some confusion about the situation.

It is important to note that the recent detentions and arrests were not made in the context of an unarmed security advisor, but rather in the context of a foreign PMSC making use of armed government security forces in contravention of existing orders by the Flag Officer Western Naval Command and in contravention of the MoU by the Nigerian Navy with the PMSC. The 'unarmed' advisor was in fact rendering training and supervision for an embarked armed security team.

The briefing paper was first published on MaRisk, Risk Intelligence's subscription-based maritime security monitoring service.

The briefing paper comprehensively reviews the current situation in Nigeria and is available for download here on the Risk Intelligence website or via the link below.

Please contact Director Maritime Security Mr. Dirk Steffen for any questions. 

In the media | 11 Dec 2014

Increased security threat against Danes?


The Saudi authorities have arrested three men in the aftermath of the attack against a Danish citizen employed in Saudi Arabia. According to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), those arrested are suspected of sympathizing with the terrorist organization Islamic State. The PET further underlines that the terrorist threat against Danish interests in the country embodies the overall strategy of the Islamic militants, where Western interests in the area are considered attractive targets.

Hans Tino Hansen, CEO at Risk Intelligence, points out that the sticking point in relation to Danish interests is whether the perpetrators were aware of the nationality of their target. The attack, if directed against westerners in general, represent nothing new – but if specifically directed against a Dane, such could indicate that Danes, and Danish interests, now are a top priority for IS-sympathizers.

For the full article in Danish, please see the link below:

Update 12 December: The article was reissued in the light of new findings, please see the below link for the follow up in Danish:


In the media | 04 Dec 2014

Only one in five hijackings are reported


Risk Intelligence senior analyst estimates that only one of five hijackings in Southeast Asia are reported to local authorities. In a region where the average number of hijackings amount to one in every two weeks, the past year's increase in the numbers is expected to represent the tip of the iceberg. Furthermore, due to a conscious approach by the pirates, seeking to avoid international attention by hijacking ships for the sole purpose of stealing their cargo, the vast majority of hijackings and cargo thefts in the region are expected to remain unregistered.

For the full article in Danish, see the link below (subscription needed):

In the media | 04 Dec 2014

Up close with the Indonesian pirates


In the work of investigating how much of the Indonesian pirate activities that went unreported, Risk Intelligences’ expert on Southeast Asia came in close touch with pirates in the Singapore Strait and the South China Sea. This relation presented the analyst with a firsthand view on how, and when, the pirates began to change their operational patterns - from having focused on hijacking smaller boats, they began to increasingly focus on palm oil and other petroleum products for resale.

The resale of stolen petroleum products have since then become increasingly advanced and internationalized. The analyst came in contact with a pirate group that had hijacked a ship in the South China Sea, transferred its palm oil to a barge and sailed it to the Singapore Straits. Here, the load was transferred to a larger tanker bound for Europe, thus mixing it with legal palm oil. In this particular case, the stolen products were sold on the open market in Rotterdam as legal palm oil.

Though this case represents the standard modus operandi, it was the first time that the analyst had seen it being associated with Europe. This is also the closest the pirates have come to the international shipping world just yet, as they previously have sought to stay below the radar of international attention.

For the full article in Danish, see the link below (subscription needed):


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